

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 04296 01 OF 03 141444Z

51

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 DRC-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 EUR-25

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 /137 W

----- 013309

O R 141355Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2759

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 4296

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REPS

MAY 13, 1974

FOLLOWING IS REPORT OF US REP'S CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REPS

AS DISTRIBUTED TO AD HOC GROUP ON MAY 14, 1974.

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT SOVIET INVITATION, US REP AND
DEPREP MET WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY ON
MAY 13. CONVERSATION FOCUSED MAINLY ON ISSUE OF WHOSE
FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. SOVIET REPS CON-
FIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO
THIS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, THEY STATED THAT, AFTER REVIEW
DURING BREAK, MOSCOW AUTHORITIES HAD CONFIRMED TH
POSITION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 04296 01 OF 03 141444Z

FROM THE OUTSET. SOVIET REPS REPEATED A NUMBER OF

ARGUMENTS FOR THIS POSITION. THUS, SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN A HARD STARTING POSITION FOR THE PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS. IT REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED WHETHER THIS POSITION WAS A TACTICAL OPENER OR WHETHER SOVIETS WILL ADHERE TO IT OVER LONGER RUN. END SUMMARY.

2. AT THE OUTSET OF THE DISCUSSION, KHLESTOV RAISED THE ISSUE OF PLENARIES. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED THAT NEXT PLENARY TAKE PLACE ON THE MORNING OF MAY 16. US REP SAID WEST PREFERRED ONE PLENARY EVERY TWO WEEKS AND ITSELF

INTENDED TO MAKE PLENARY STATEMENT ONLY AT BI-WEEKLY INTERVALS. ALLIES WOULD PREFER BI-WEEKLY PLENARIES WHERE BOTH SIDES SPOKE, BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO AGREEMENT WHEREBY EACH SIDE SPOKE AT ALTERNATE PLENARIES. EAST COULD OF COURSE MAKE PRESENTATION AT EACH WEEKLY PLENARY IF IT SO DESIRED, BUT WEST WOULD ADHERE TO BI-WEEKLY SCHEDULE FOR ITS OWN PLENARY PRESENTATIONS. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD TAKE UP THESE IDEAS WITH WARSAW PACT MEMBERS AND GIVE A RESPONSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

3. IN RESPONSE TO KHLESTOV'S QUESTION ABOUT ACTIVITIES DURING RECESS, US REP MENTIONED THAT HE HAD APPEARED BEFORE TWO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WHOSE MEMBERS HAD SEEMED SATISFIED THAT A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION WAS UNDERWAY IN VIENNA. WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES WERE ALSO SATISFIED FROM TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT WITH COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD HAVE HOPED FOR MORE PROGRESS. WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES HAD APPROVED EAST-WEST AGREEMENT REACHED IN INFORMAL SESSIONS TO FOCUS ON EFFORT TO RESOLVE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

4. KHLESTOV SAID MOSCOW AUTHORITIES WERE ALSO SATISFIED WITH COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR INCLUDING ATMOSPHERE AND MODALITIES OF WORK. KHLESTOV THEN ASKED US REP FOR HIS ESTIMATE OF PROSPECTS FOR MOVEMENT DURING THE PRESENT ROUND.

5. US REP RESPONDED THAT SINCE BOTH SIDES AGREED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 04296 01 OF 03 141444Z

REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAD BEEN DONE ALREADY ON THIS QUESTION

TO WORK OUT REMAINING ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE TO FOUR WEEKS. US REP THEN ASKED KHLESTOV WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THIS TIMING POSSIBILITY.

6. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT, DURING HIS DELEGATION'S STAY

IN MOSCOW, SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD REVIEWED THE ENTIRE STATUS OF THE TALKS THUS FAR. THEY HAD ENDORSED THE VIEW THAT THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET WAS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. IN THIS CONTEXT, SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD CONCLUDED THAT, FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT, IT WAS AN ISSUE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. IF THIS ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED, RAPID PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

7. SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE HOPED THE ALLIES HAD TAKEN CLOSE NOTE OF THE WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE OF 19 APRIL BECAUSE THE VIEW WHICH KHLESTOV HAD JUST EXPRESSED WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN THAT COMMUNIQUE, ESPECIALLY IN ITS REFERENCE TO UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. COMMENT: SMIRNOVSKY'S IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THAT THEIR SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF THEY SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS DID NOT DO SO AT THE SAME TIME. END COMMENT: US DEP REP SAID HE DID NOT FIND WHAT KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY HAD SAID WITH REGARD TO PHASING WAS SURPRISING; PERHAPS IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BELIEF OF SOME OBSERVERS THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT BE READY TO MOVE IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER CSCE HAD REACHED SOME POINT OF DECISION.

8. KHLESTOV'S FIRST REACTION TO THIS WAS A BROAD SMILE. HE THEN DENIED THAT THE SOVIETS MADE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO MAKE A MOVE NOW IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 04296 02 OF 03 141452Z

51

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 DRC-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 EUR-25

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 /137 W

----- 013423

O P 141355Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2760
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 4296

FROM US REP MBFR

THE WEST COULD TEST SOVIET WILLINGNESS BY AGREEING THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THEN WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO SEE TO THEIR OWN SATISFACTION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO MOVE RAPIDLY AND WITHOUT ANY CONNECTION TO OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. SMIRNOVSKY REMARKED THAT THE REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPEANS COULD BE VERY SMALL. IT WAS THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE BEGINNING WHICH WAS IMPORTANT.

9. US REP SAID HE FOUND THE REMARKS OF KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTING. THE ALLIES CONSIDERED THEY HAD GIVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCE ON THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND PHASE. THEY HAD GIVEN CLEAR REASONS, WHICH REPRESENTED THE JOINT POSITION OF ALL THE ALLIES, WHY REDUCTIONS OF OTHER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 04296 02 OF 03 141452Z

WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL A SECOND PHASE. US REP HOPED AND EXPECTED THAT SOVIET REPS HAD REPORTED THESE VIEWS ACCURATELY TO MOSCOW. THESE REASONS HAD NOT CHANGED. HE COULD SEE NO HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON A POSITION CALLING FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

10. KHLESTOV SAID THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD EITHER BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET IN A FAVORABLE SENSE, OR THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS IN THE PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS. THE INFORMAL SESSIONS WOULD JUST BE TEA PARTIES. THEY COULD EVEN TAKE PLACE EVERY TWO WEEKS JUST AS THE ALLIES SUGGESTED PLENARIES SHOULD, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER "FOR REPORTING PURPOSES" IF THEY DID TAKE PLACE ONCE A WEEK.

11. US REP POINTED OUT THAT ALLIED REPS HAD SAID A

GOOD DEAL ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PAST MONTHS. IF THERE WERE STILL PRACTICAL PROBLEMS TO BE LOOKED AT, THAT WAS ONE THING AND THIS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. IF THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN A DECISION OF PRINCIPLE, THAT WAS ANOTHER. WAS THE ISSUE ONE OF PRINCIPLE OR DID THEY HAVE PROBLEMS OF A PRACTICAL NATURE, AND IF SO, WHAT WERE THEY? WHAT WERE THE REAL ISSUES INVOLVED HERE? KHLESTOV SAID SOVIETS WANTED TO KNOW HOW MANY FORCES THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD REDUCE AND WHEN. US REP POINTED OUT THAT THE ALLIES HAD TOLD EASTERN REPS THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION WOULD START, AND THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOCUS ON OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN THE DIMENSION OF THE OVERALL REDUCTIONS PROPOSED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE EAST COULD CALCULATE FOR ITSELF HOW MANY REDUCTIONS OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE. KHLESTOV OBJECTED THAT SOVIETS DID NOT KNOW WHEN WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD

ACTUALLY REDUCE OR EVEN IF THEY WOULD DO SO. US REP SAID THAT, AS MATTER OF PRACTICAL POLITICS, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY DOUBT THAT, IF A SUCCESSFUL FIRST PHASE TOOK PLACE, THIS WOULD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 04296 02 OF 03 141452Z

BE FOLLOWED BY A SUCCESSFUL SECOND PHASE. IF THERE WAS GOING TO BE A SECOND PHASE, IF THE SOVIETS KNEW WHEN THE PHASE II NEGOTIATION WAS GOING TO START AND HOW MANY WESTERN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN IT, AND IF ALL THE PROBABILITIES WERE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE OUTCOME FOLLOWING A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I, HE COULD NOT SEE WHAT THE SOVIETS REALLY HOPED TO GAIN IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS THROUGH PURELY SYMBOLIC WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE.

12. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS THE ACT OF REDUCTION WHICH WAS IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE WILLINGNESS TO JOIN IN THE PROCESS. THE ALLIES HAD SPOKEN BACK IN FEBRUARY ABOUT ASSURANCES THE ALLIES MIGHT MAKE CONCERNING WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD RECEIVED THIS IDEA WITH SOME INTEREST. BUT BOTH HIS DELEGATION AND OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED AT THE ACTUAL OUTCOME. ALL THEY HEARD WAS THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START AT A FIXED TIME. THEY HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING PRACTICAL ABOUT WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE.

13. US REP ASKED KHLESTOV TO SPECIFY WHAT HE REALLY

WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT THE WESTERN POSITION WHICH HE
HAD NOT ALREADY HEARD FROM THE ALLIES. KHLESTOV SAID HE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 04296 03 OF 03 141434Z

51

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 DRC-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 EUR-25

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 /137 W

----- 013193

O R 141355Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2761

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 4296

FROM US REP MBFR

WANTED TO KNOW WHEN ANDHOW MUCH THE EUROPEANS WOULD REDUCE.
HE WISHED TO ADD THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT INSIST ON REDUC-
TIONS BY LUXEMBOURG. HE HOPED THAT THIS GESTURE OF GOODWILL
WOULD BE MATCHED BY THE ALLIES. BUT WHAT WERE THE DIFFICULTIES
FOR THE EUROPEANS IN MAKING A SMALL SYMBOLIC REDUCTION AT THE
OUTSET?

14. US REP EXPLAINED THAT THE SITUATION OF THE US AND USSR
WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE SITUATION OF THOSE WHOSE TERRIT-
ORIES AND FORCES WERE WITHIN THE REDUCTION AREA EVEN THOUGH
THE RESULTING CEILING WAS A GLOBAL ONE AND THE ALLIES RETAINED
THE RIGHT UNDER IT TO MAKE UP SHORT FALLS IF ONE ALLY REDUCED
FURTHER IN THE FUTURE. NONETHELESS, THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
LOCATED WITHIN THE AREA WOULD BE ACCEPTING A LIMITATION ON

THEIR OVERALL FORCES EVEN THOUGH INDIRECTLY. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH THE US AND USSR.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 04296 03 OF 03 141434Z

15. KHLESTOV SAID IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET SHOULD BLOCK THE NEGOTIATIONS. TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WAS VERY IMPORTANT BOTH INTERNATIONALLY AND NATIONALLY FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

16. US REP SAID HE SHARED THE VIEW THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE PROGRESS. THEREFORE, THE US AND THE SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. HE WAS SURE THAT IF THIS WERE DONE, OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW IN PHASE II. KHLESTOV SAID THE WEST WAS ONLY WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT AS TO WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WOULD START, NOT ON THEIR OUTCOME, BUT THE SOVIETS WERE EXPECTED TO UNDERTAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT IN PHASE I. THIS WAS INEQUITABLE. US REP SAID SOVIETS HAD EARLIER RAISED THIS PROBLEM OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF PHASE II FAILS TO HAVE AN ACTUAL OUTCOME. THIS SEEMED TO HIM TO BE ANOTHER PRACTICAL PROBLEM AND ONE TO WHICH SOME SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOUND, RATHER THAN AN ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE. BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO PRACTICAL

ASPECTS IF THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO INSIST THAT OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. THE SOVIETS REPS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE CHOICE BETWEEN COMMON EFFORTS TO SOLVE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND MAINTAINING A POSITION OF PRINCIPLE.

17. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER NEWSPAPER ARTICLES HE HAD READ ABOUT US NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS REFLECTED A CHANGE IN US POLICY. US REP SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN US POLICY IN THESE REGARDS. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER THE UK DECISION TO REDUCE ITS DEFENSE BUDGET WOULD RESULT IN A CHANGE IN THE BRITISH ATTITUDE ABOUT REDUCING FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. US REP SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THE UK WAS MERELY CONSIDERING REDUCTION OF ITS MILITARY EXPENDITURES BUT HAD NOT YET WORKED OUT PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS. HUMES

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, MEETING REPORTS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA04296
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740118-0450
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740548/aaaabqhl.tel
Line Count: 375
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <07 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REPS MAY 13, 1974
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, NATO, MBFR, (KHLESTOV)
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005